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theravages of senescence, and remain healthy and mentally competent,couldnt we avoid becoming jaded with life by gradually varyingour interests over time, adding to and perhaps replacing some of ourcategorical desires, again and again? Several theorists includingNagel (1986, p. 224, n. 3), Glover (1977, p. 57), and Fischer (1994),have argued that the lives of superseniors need not become dull andtedious. Williamss view is that it is not possible to makeeternal life desirable (which claim is not identical to the claim thateternal life would inevitably be bad for us). Varying my categoricaldesires will not work, because, to be desirable, the endless life Idesign for myself must meet two conditions: (1) it shouldclearly be me who lives forever, and (2) the state inwhich I survive should be one that, to me looking forward, will beadequately related, in the life it presents, to those aims I now havein wanting to survive at all. (1973, p. 83) If I replace mycategorical desires, I fall afoul of at least one of these conditions.Life under the future desires is detached from life under my currentcategorical desires. Moreover, the desires I give myself in the futurewill be elements of a character that is very different from my currentcharacter; replacing my current character with an entirely differentone later in life makes it far less clear, Williams appears to think,that the individual living that later life is me. The degree ofidentification needed with the later life is absolutelyminimal. (1973, p. 85) Williamss claim that immortality cannot be made desirableremains controversial. It is not obvious that eternal life isundesirable if it involves changing our categorical desires andcharacters (insofar as our characters are defined by the desires). Noris it obvious that such changes must violate Williamss twoconditions for the desirability of continued life. Williams seems tothink that the individual who is changed in this way will not clearlybe the same person as before, but he stops short of saying that itclearly will not be the same person (indeed, he defends a bodilycontinuity criterion for identity in The Self and theFuture, pp. 4663, so he presumably thinks that a persondoes survive changes of desires and character). ConcerningWilliamss second condition, his view is that if we replace ourcharacters and desires, there is nothing left by which he canjudge whether future life is desirable (1093, p. 85). Yet itseems reasonable to take the view now that it would be good for me todevelop and fulfil desires in the future I now lack.Many of us would welcome the prospect of gradually transforming ourinterests and projects over time. The gradual, continuoustransformation of our desires and projects does not end our lives, orexistence. It is distinct from, and preferable to, annihilation. If wecould live endlessly, the stages of our lives would display reducedconnectedness, yet remain continuous, which is a property that isimportant in the kind of survival most of us prize. Even afterdrinking from the fountain of eternal youth, we would tend to focus onrelatively short stretches of our indefinitely extensive lives, beinganimated by the specific projects and relationships we have then.However, sometimes we would turn our attention to long stretches oflife, and then, prizing continuity, we might well phase in new andworthwhile undertakings that build upon, and do not wholly replace,the old. (For further discussion of the desirability of eternal life,see Overall 2003, Bortolotti 2009, Smuts 2011, Luper 2012b, Altshuler2016, Buben 2016, Cholbi 2016, and Fischer 2019.) 8. Can Deaths Harmfulness be Reduced? Even if death is usually bad for those of us who die, perhaps itneed not be bad for us, if we prepare ourselves suitably.This might be possible if some form of preferentialism is true, andif, by altering our desires, we could cease to have any interests thatdying would impair. For then we might be able to thanatizeour desires, in this sense: we might abandon all desires that deathmight thwart. Among these are desires we can satisfy only if we liveon for a few days, but also desires we cannot possibly satisfy withinthe span of a normal lifetime, and the desire for immortality itself.Instead of desiring that some project of mine succeed, which is adesire that might be thwarted by my death, I might instead adopt aconditionalized version of this desire, namely: should I live on, letmy project succeed. If all goes well, thanatizing would insulate usfrom harm from death by leaving us with no interests with which dyinginterferes. Unfortunately, this strategy will backfire. The main problem is thatdeath can interfere with desire fulfillment not just by falsifying theobjects of our desires but also by precluding our having desires(Luper 2013). So even if we resolve, from now on, to limit ourselvesto desires whose objects cannot be falsified by death, we are stillvulnerable to the harm death will do us if it precludes our having andfulfilling desires. Hence thanatizing would force us to avoid havingany desires whose fulfillment would have benefitted us, and to denyourselves such desires would be as bad for us as the harm we aretrying to avoid. However, the core idea of adapting our desires is useful, if not takedto an extreme. It is prudent to avoid taking on goals we cannotpossibly attain, and hence prudent to eschew projects that cannotpossibly be completed during the course of a normal lifetime.

What is the philosophy of socrates. Death socrates. Socrates death reason. What did socrates believe about death. Socrates uitleg. Human socrates.